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ABSTRACT 
 
Research on the impact of corporate governance on firm value has provided inconclusive results. 
The findings vary depending on the sample, country of study (regulation, law, shareholder 
protection, market development, etc.) and methodology employed. Many studies are unable to 
detect significant connection between corporate governance and firm value. 
 
Unlike the United States, Canada adopts a principles-based approach in corporate governance 
regulation. Canadian companies are required to disclose whether they comply with the corporate 
governance guidelines set up by authorities (such as the Toronto Stock Exchange) or explain 
deviations from the guidelines.  
 
Using panel data from 2004 to 2008 in Canada the empirical analyses in this paper show that the 
finding on the connection between corporate governance and firm value is sensitive to the 
methodology employed. Controlling relevant information is crucial to the results. When the data is 
analyzed in a self-selection framework, it is found that some time-varying unobservable firm 
characteristics that make firms adopt high-standard corporate governance also increase firm 
value, and somewhat surprisingly, adopting better corporate governance practices per se seems to 
decrease firm value. The results support the view that firms use sound corporate governance to 
signal their favorable private information.  
 
Keywords:  Corporate Governance; Firm Value; Self-Selection; Canada 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
esearch on corporate governance has gained increasing attention and popularity during the past two 
decades. It has reached even a new level in the post-Enron environment. While individual studies are 
too many to list, reviews of relevant literature alone compile a long list (e.g., Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010; Denis, 2001; Gillan, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Young, et al., 2008). A central question in the 
corporate governance literature is whether sound corporate governance actually increases firm value. Many studies 
find strong positive association between corporate governance and firm value (e.g., Black, Love and Rachinsky, 
2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Gompers et al., 2003; Prevost, et al., 2002), but many are unable to find 
such a connection (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Many others report mixed results (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2010; 
Bebchuk, et al., 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Chi and Lee, 2010).  In general the findings vary depending on the 
sample, country of study (regulation, law, shareholder protection, market development, etc.) and methodology 
employed. 
 
While competing theories exist on corporate governance, in North America corporate governance is 
prominently regarded as a mechanism to address the agency problem (Clarke, 2004; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1986). When firms are supposed to adopt corporate governance practice (and other strategies) to maximize 
R 
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shareholder value, controlling shareholders and/or the management may prevent the adoption of sound governance 
mechanism because of various costs associated with such adoption, both in terms of implementation costs and 
private cost in the form of reduced ability to expropriate other shareholders. In general the overall costs and benefits 
associated with the adoption of corporate governance attributes depend on various firm-level and country-level 
characteristics (Doidge et al., 2004). 
 
A key issue in empirical corporate governance research is the quality of information and appropriate 
control of relevant information in a research design (more generally this point applies to most empirical studies in 
corporate finance). While most corporate strategies – financing, capital budgeting, dividends, growth, corporate 
governance, risk management, etc. – are all connected in an endogenous and complicated fashion, corporate 
governance theories do not provide a definitely clear set of relevant firm characteristics that need to be controlled 
when one studies the association between corporate governance and firm value. Prior literature can provide some 
guidance, but the information to be used or controlled in an empirical study often differs based on the objective of 
the study, country of study, sample, and more importantly, the availability of relevant information. For example, in 
some corporate governance studies of the U.S. market (e.g., Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009), a dummy control 
variable on American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is introduced to distinguish its unique nature of business. But the 
ADR dummy is not used in most other U.S. studies. 
 
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it empirically shows the impact of employed 
methodology when studying the connection between corporate governance and firm value. While most prior 
empirical research on corporate governance employs cross section or pooled regressions, it leaves open the 
possibility that endogeneity or bias due to omitted firm characteristics explain the observed correlations. The panel 
data methodology can address this concern (Green, 2008). Some literatures (e.g., Black, Love, and Rachinsky, 2006; 
Gupta et al., 2009) do utilize panel data models, but usually do not show the comparative results. This paper 
provides clear evidence that results from pooled regressions can be unreliable or even misleading. 
 
Second, and more importantly, this paper investigates the effect of corporate governance in a self-selection 
framework. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt of such a model on Canadian corporations. Unlike 
the U.S., Canada adopts a flexible principles-based approach to corporate governance regulations. Firms are allowed 
to choose governance practices and explain any deviation from the recommended guidelines. While most previous 
Canadian studies find not significant association between corporate governance and firm value (Adjaoud et al., 
2007;  Gupta et al., 2009; Klein et al., 2005), this paper provides a fresh perspective on this lack of impact by 
corporate governance. The results of the self-selection model suggest that firms may use corporate governance to 
signal to the market some desirable (but unobservable) characteristics; however, adopting sound corporate 
governance per se may actually reduce their firm value.  
 
1.1  Canadian Approach to Corporate Governance: Comply or Explain 
 
Despite the close connections in business and financial market between Canada and the U.S., the corporate 
governance in the U.K. actually has a more profound impact on Canadian regulations and practices. Deeply rooted 
in a laissez-faire culture, the U.S. adopts a rules-based approach toward corporate governance regulation that is 
aimed at mandatory compliance with legislations and stock exchange requirements, with a great emphasis placed on 
regulatory enforcement than voluntary compliance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 adopts even more mandatory 
rules that firms listed in the U.S. markets have to follow. Despite these mandatory requirements the rules in the U.S. 
(such as those of NYSE and NASDAQ) are generally more empowering than the corporate governance guidelines 
that Canadian and U.K. companies are encouraged to follow.  
 
The corporate governance reform movement in Canada started in 1970s when Canadian lawmakers 
imposed greater fiduciary duties on corporate directors and executives. Due to the lack of a national regulation body 
such as the SEC in the U.S., Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) has largely assumed the responsibility of promoting and 
regulating corporate governance practices in Canada. In 1994, under great influence of the work of the Cadbury 
Committee in the U.K., TSE conducted a landmark study on corporate governance reform that generated the 
milestone report “Where Were the Directors? Guideline for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada”, which is 
commonly referred to as the Dey Report. The Dey Report made 14 recommendations focused on the board of 
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directors and its relationship with shareholders and management.
1
 Although these recommendations do not possess 
the same power of regulation, companies are required as a condition of listing on the TSE to publicly disclose the 
extent of their compliance with the recommended best practices and to describe the procedures implemented to meet 
the same corporate governance objectives wherever their practices deviate from such guidelines.
2
 This principles-
based approach is generally consistent with the approach taken in the U.K. The choice of such a “comply-or-
explain” approach is usually attributed to a relatively small talent pool for corporate directors in Canada and the 
large number of small Canadian public companies that lack the financial resources to comply with the more 
stringent requirements enunciated in the U.S. Rooted in the belief that “one size does not fit all”, the principles-
based approach essentially lets the capital markets be the judge of corporate governance practices (Broshko and Li, 
2006). Nevertheless, there is evidence that the corporate governance reform movement in Canada is still in an earlier 
stage of development than it is in the U.S. and the U.K.  
 
1.2  Evidence from Canada, Germany, and U.K. 
 
Data on Canadian corporate governance has been available only since early 2000s. Both Klein et al. (2005) 
and Adjaoud et al. (2007) work on a cross-section of Canadian firms in 2002, and do not detect a significant 
connection between the composite corporate governance index (reported by the Globe and Mail; see details below) 
and most measures on firm value. However, both papers acknowledge that endogeneity is a potential problem is 
their research design, but neither explicitly deals with this issue due to the limit of the cross-sectional data, which 
leaves room for future research. Interestingly, working with a similar sample in 2002, in an event study Foerster and 
Huen (2004) finds a significantly positive association between the governance scores and excess stock returns in a 
two-day window around the release of the governance scores by the Globe and Mail. Working with a multiple-year 
(2002-05) data sample and panel data methodology, Gupta et al. (2009) does not find an association between the 
composite or sub-category corporate governance scores and various measures of firm value. 
 
Two other countries with a similar corporate governance regulation approach that have been studied are 
Germany and the U.K. Goncharov et al. (2006) investigates the impact of compliance with the German corporate 
governance code on stock valuation in a self-selection framework. They find that compliance with the Code is 
value-adding after controlling for the endogeneity bias. Also working with a sample of German companies, 
Talaulicar and Werder (2008) employs the cluster analysis technique to identify discrete groups of companies with 
similar patterns of code observance. They find that companies with very similar rates of overall compliance can be 
assigned to different clusters based on different patterns of code conformity. 
 
Weir and Laing (2000) works with a sample of 200 firms from the U.K. in 1992 and 1995 and reveals 
mixed evidence that governance structures are associated with performance. Although some particular compliance 
(e.g., a remuneration committee) with the Cadbury recommendations seems to be related to better performance, 
complete compliance with the recommended model of corporate governance does not appear to be associated with 
firm performance. 
 
The remaining of the paper proceeds as following. Section 2 describes the data and provides its descriptive 
statistics. Section 3 introduces three model options and collects the empirical results of each model with comments 
and discussions. The concluding remarks are in Section 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Two follow-up projects of the Dey Report make further recommendations on a broad range of issues in corporate governance: 
“Five Years to the Dey: Report on Corporate Governance” (1999) conducted by TSE and Institute of Corporate Directors, and 
“Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture” (2001, commonly known as the “Saucier Report”) conducted by Charted 
Accountants of Canada, TSE, and Canadian Venture Exchange. 
2 There are a few exceptions of mandatory rules such as those relating to audit committees. 
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2.  DATA 
 
2.1  Data Sources 
 
The corporate governance scores used in this study are from the Report on Business (ROB) published 
annually by a Canadian national newspaper the Globe and Mail. Since the report was first published in 2002 the 
questions and scoring system have become increasingly comprehensive. In general the questions are grouped in four 
categories: board composition, shareholding and compensation, shareholder rights, and disclosure.
3
 In 2008 the four 
categories count for 37%, 25%, 28%, and 10%, respectively, of the overall score. The maximum score is 100. 
 
The financial data used in this study are collected from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and 
Retrieval (SEDAR) databases. SEDAR, established by Canadian Securities Administrators, provides access to most 
public securities documents and information filed by public companies and investment funds. Stock prices are 
obtained from DataStream.  
 
2.2  Summary Statistics 
 
During the period of 2004-2008 the Globe and Mail corporate governance reports cover between 180 and 
218 Canadian corporations each year. In this study we work on a sample of firms that are in the report every year. A 
few such firms have to be dropped due to mergers and acquisitions since 2008 (financial data are no longer included 
in databases). Eventually we have a balanced-panel sample of 106 firms over a 5-year period, i.e., 530 firm-year 
observations. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
ROB is the corporate governance score reported by the Globe and Mail. Management ownership is the percentage of shares held 
by the top five executives in management. Widely-held is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is widely held (no 
single investor holds 10% or more of the shares). CEO/Chair split is a dummy that equals one if different individuals occupy the 
CEO and Chair of the board positions. Natural Resources, Utility, and Financial are sector dummies. Cross-listing is a dummy 
that equals one if a company is cross-listed on TSX and another stock exchange (e.g., NASDAQ, NYSE).  
The firms are grouped into two subsamples depending on whether its ROB score is lower or higher than the average in each year. 
***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level respectively. 
 
All firms Below-average firms Above-average firms Difference in 
sub-sample 
means Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Tobin’s Q 1.76 1.49 1.86 1.75 1.65 1.12 0.20 
ROB Score 73.45 13.89 62.34 8.20 85.62 6.91 -23.27 *** 
Assets ($mil) 33,065 89,859 12,184 27,120 55,927 122,922 -43,743*** 
Sales ($mil) 6,699 8,683 6,419 9,456 7,005 7,736 -586 
ROA (%) 4.75 8.84 4.52 10.01 4.99 7.33 -0.46 
Leverage 3.58 5.72 2.39 3.47 4.88 7.21 -2.49 *** 
Management 
Ownership (%) 2.79 8.96 4.18 11.24 1.27 5.05 2.91 *** 
Widely-held 0.41  0.21  0.62  -0.42 *** 
CEO/Chair Split 0.82  0.74  0.90  -0.16 *** 
Natural Resources 0.32  0.30  0.35  -0.05 
Utilities 0.12  0.08  0.17  -0.10 *** 
Financial 0.19  0.14  0.24  -0.09 *** 
Cross-listing 0.45  0.35  0.57  -0.22 *** 
# of firm-years 530 277 253  
 
 
                                                 
3 For more details of the methodology employed in 2009 see http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/board-
games/board-games-2009/article1375949/#custom. 
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As shown in Table 1, Canadian firms that adopt better-than-average corporate governance are, on average, 
bigger (as measured by total asset), with higher leverage, and lower management ownership. Their average Tobin’s 
Q is lower than that of the firms adopting below-average governance practices, but the difference is not significant. 
In the meantime, firms with above-average corporate governance are more likely to be widely held, to have split 
CEO and Chair of the board positions, and to be cross-listed in another stock exchange (mostly NYSE or 
NASDAQ). 
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS 
 
A typical inquiry into the association between corporate governance and firm value is as following: 
 
      
               (1) 
 
where    is a measure of firm value such as Tobin’s Q, and    is some measure on corporate governance. In this 
paper two measures on corporate governance are considered: the corporate governance score provided by Report on 
Business at the Globe and Mail, and a dummy variable with one representing an above-average corporate 
governance score. X is a collection of control variables that may affect firm value so that the effect of corporate 
governance, , can be separated from other factors’. 
 
To follow the literature (Adjaoud, et al., 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Black et al., 2006a, 2006b; Bozec et 
al., 2010; Gompers et al., 2003; Gupta, et al., 2009; Klein, et al., 2005) a number of control variables are selected in 
our empirical analyses. 
 
Firm size, as measured by logarithm of total assets and sales, is to control for potential advantages from 
economies of scale and scope, market power, and market opportunities. Leverage (debt/equity ratio) controls for 
different risk characteristics. 
 
Dummy variables are appointed for companies in the utility, financial services and natural resources 
sectors. These dummies take care of the unique government regulation in the utilities sector, the special relationship 
between book and market values in the financial sector, and the difficulty of valuing reserves in the natural resources 
sector. These difficulties often cause researchers to eliminate such firms from their samples, but such elimination 
would lose too much information (over 60% of the firms in the sample) given the composition of the Canadian 
economy. This choice is consistent with Klein et al. (2005) among others. 
 
To classify the ownership, a firm with no block holders (10% or higher) is labeled widely-held. Also 
controlled is the collective stock holding in the company by top management. A dummy is used for the split position 
of CEO and Chair of the board of directors to indicate the structure of the board. To control whether a company is 
subject to another set of corporate governance regulations, a cross-listing dummy indicates if the firm is also traded 
on another exchange (e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ). 
 
3.1  Pooled Regression Model 
 
Empirical corporate governance studies may work with a cross-section of data (e.g., Klein et al., 2005, and 
Adjaoud et al., 2007) or data over a number of periods (e.g., Gupta et al., 2009). When working with data over a 
period of time, for various reasons, researchers often run pooled regressions with year-dummies to control the 
special effect of each period. 
 
In Table 2 the results with the two measures of corporate governance are almost identical except that the 
corporate governance score (CG) is significant at 10% level while the corporate governance dummy (CD) is not. 
This weak or lack of connection between corporate governance and firm value in Canada is consistent with the 
findings in the literature (Adjaoud et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2009; Klein et al., 2005). 
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Table 2: Results of Pooled Regression 
The logarithm of Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable in the regressions. CG is the corporate governance score reported in the 
ROB by the Globe and Mail. CD is a dummy variable of corporate governance that equals one if a firm’s CG score is above 
average in that year and zero otherwise. TA and SA are the logarithm of total assets and sales (measured in million dollars) 
respectively. RA is return to assets. LV represents the logarithm of leverage. WH is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company is widely held. SP is a dummy that equals one if different individuals occupy the CEO and Chair of the board positions. 
MO is the logarithm of management (top five executives) ownership (common shares, as a percentage) in the company. NR, UT, 
and FI are sector dummies for natural resources, utility, and financial industry respectively. CL is a dummy that equals one if a 
company is cross-listed on TSX and another stock exchange (e.g., NASDAQ, NYSE). Y5 to Y8 are year dummies for the years 
2005 to 2008.  
***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level respectively. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
CG 0.003*  
CD  0.047 
TA 0.019 0.019 
SA -0.080*** -0.080*** 
RA 0.011*** 0.011*** 
LV -0.132*** -0.127*** 
WH 0.066 0.079* 
SP -0.068 -0.063 
MO -0.003 -0.004 
NR -0.082* -0.080* 
UT -0.197*** -0.192*** 
FI -0.107 -0.113 
CL 0.050 0.059 
Y5 0.054 0.067 
Y6 0.028 0.021 
Y7 0.067 0.071 
Y8 -0.181*** -0.171*** 
constant 1.610*** 1.770*** 
R-squared 0.371 0.370 
 
 
3.2  Fixed Effects Panel Model  
 
As discussed earlier, a key issue in empirical governance studies is to control all the potentially relevant 
factors to isolate and focus on the effect of corporate governance on firm value. However, the list of potentially 
relevant factors is long and prior literature only provides partial guidance. If the missing (maybe unobservable) firm 
characteristics are correlated with the observable firm characteristics included in regression (1), this correlation can 
cause biased or even misleading results. The pooled regression specification is particularly vulnerable to the issue of 
omitted variables. Fortunately the fixed-effect estimation of panel date can address this issue by eliminating the 
effects of any unchanging firm characteristics (Green, 2008).
4
 Panel data on corporate governance have been 
available only in the past few years, and there have been a limited number of attempts with such data (Black et al., 
2006a;  Black, Love, and Rachinsky, 2006; Gupta et al., 2009). 
 
In Table 3 the results with the two measures of corporate governance are very similar, but with some 
important differences compared to those in Table 2. First, the significance of the corporate governance dummy (CD) 
suggests that, in general, adopting better-than-average corporate governance may reduce the firm value. Second, the 
corporate governance score (CG) is no longer significant in Model 1, which is consistent with the findings in 
previous Canadian studies (Klein et al., 2005, Adjaoud et al., 2007, and Gupta et al., 2009). Third, and very 
importantly, the sign and significance of several control variables are different from the results reported in Table 2. 
For example, while the size of the firm as measured by total assets (TA) seems to be unrelated to firm value in Table 
2, it becomes significant with a changed sign in Table 3. The opposite occurs for leverage (LV).  
                                                 
4
 Although we believe that the fixed effects model is more appropriate in this context due to the potential correlation between 
observable (including corporate governance measures) and omitted unobservable firm characteristics, as a robustness check the 
random effects model is also estimated, whose results in most cases are not significantly different from those of the fixed effects 
model as per the Haussman Test. The results of the random effects model are not reported to save space.  
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Table 3: Results of Fixed Effects Panel Estimation 
The logarithm of Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable in the regressions. The explanatory variables’ descriptions are the same as 
those in Table 2. The model is estimated with the within-group procedure. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1-, 5-
, or 10-percent level respectively. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
CG 0.002  
CD  -0.061* 
TA -0.200*** -0.191*** 
SA -0.065*** -0.068*** 
RA 0.008*** 0.008*** 
LV 0.026 0.027 
WH 0.007 0.011 
SP 0.056 0.057 
MO -0.005 -0.006 
Y5 0.077*** 0.081*** 
Y6 0.092*** 0.081*** 
Y7 0.154*** 0.153*** 
Y8 -0.082*** -0.078*** 
R-squared 0.366 0.369 
 
 
The observations on the difference between OLS and fixed effects results are consistent with the findings in 
Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006), which works on a panel data sample over the period 1999 to 2005 from Russia. 
Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) is the only literature (as we realize) that reports comparative results of OLS and 
panel data estimations. Since the fixed effects panel estimation essentially controls all the firm characteristics 
(observable or unobservable) that do not change over time, the difference between Tables 2 and 3 shows the 
importance of  controlling these firm characteristics in governance research and that failing to do so may yield 
misleading results. Empirical results based on cross-sectional or pooled regressions, not matter how comprehensive 
the control variables are, are vulnerable to this challenge. 
 
3.3  A self-Selection Investigation 
 
The Canadian approach to corporate governance regulation is to allow corporations to choose the 
appropriate governance practices and let the market be the judge (as reflected in measures such as Tobin’s Q). In 
such an environment the general assumption is that firms adopt appropriate governance practices to maximize the 
firm value. This “choose-your-own-governance” approach suggests that the mechanism of self-selection may be at 
work. 
 
Regression (1) cannot be consistently estimated due to the interconnection between the corporate 
governance measure and control variables, especially when the corporate governance is measured by a dummy. The 
estimates of regression (1) may be misleading if a typical firm that adopts high-standard corporate governance 
would have a higher firm value whether or not it adopted better corporate governance. The problem is one of self-
selection. Self-selection models are discussed in Maddala (1983) and Green (2008) among others. Li and Prabhala 
(2007) is an excellent discussion on their applications in corporate finance.  
 
While not in a complete self-selection model, Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) investigates factors that 
make firms to adopt above-average corporate governance practice. Their findings are consistent with the agency 
theory. Goncharov et al. (2006) is an attempt on the self-selection model with German data in 2002 and 2003, which 
focuses on stock price and return as measures of firm performance. It finds clear evidence of self-selection in 
German corporate governance practices. 
 
A popular solution to the self-selection issue is to estimate the model in two steps as proposed by Heckman 
(1979): a probit estimation of firms’ corporate governance choices (above- or below-average), followed by a revised 
regression with the addition of inverse Mills ratio (IMR). As argued by Li and Prabhala (2007), the process of 
correction for self-selection can be viewed as including either an omitted variable (from a statistics perspective) or a 
measure of private information. The latter interpretation is of greater interest in finance research. While researchers 
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try the best to include all the relevant information in the probit model of firms’ corporate governance choices, there 
are always some firm characteristics (maybe unobservable, potentially time-varying) for while data cannot be 
collected. Given the nature of the unobservable (or private) information the best one can do is to include its 
expectation (conditional on observable information) – the IMR – in the revised regression as an additional 
explanatory variable. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Probit Estimation 
The dependent variable is the corporate governance dummy. The explanatory variables’ descriptions are the same as those in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level respectively. 
Variable Coefficients 
TA -0.011 
SA -0.051 
RA 0.016** 
LV 0.538*** 
WH 0.878*** 
SP 0.363** 
MO -0.069** 
NR 0.409** 
UT 0.649*** 
FI -0.541* 
CL 0.493*** 
Y5 -0.188 
Y6 -0.237 
Y7 -0.081 
Y8 -0.009 
McFadden R-squared 0.236 
 
 
The estimates reported in Table 4 show that, in general, firms that are more profitable, with higher 
leverage, widely held, with split CEO and Chair of the board positions, and lower management ownership are more 
likely to adopt above-average corporate governance standards, when the sector and years effects are controlled. 
These observations are generally consistent with the findings in the literature (e.g., Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009). Firms with high leverage depend more on external financing, so they may adopt sound corporate governance 
to send a positive signal to the market (further discussion will be made on this point later on). Companies with 
dispersed ownership (i.e., no dominant owners) and the split of CEO and chair of the board positions generally have 
less conflict among shareholders so that they are more likely to adopt sound corporate governance. Unlike 
corporations in the U.S. where the major issue in corporate governance is to align managerial interest with that of 
shareholders, the Canadian governance challenge is how to temper the alignment of managerial and controlling 
shareholder interest to the detriment of minority shareholders (Sarra, 2003). Thus firms with lower management 
ownership are more likely to adopt sound corporate governance. 
 
Although it is often believed that large firms have more resources or are under more pressure (due to their 
visibility in the market) to adopt sound governance practices, the firm size per se (measured by assets or sales) is not 
connected to adopted governance standards when other factors are controlled.  
 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the second step of the self-selection model, where the conditional 
expectation of the unobservable private information, the IMR, is added as an explanatory variable to the regression 
model. The results in Table 5 show some significant difference from those in Table 3. In particular, the significance 
of IMR suggests that the unobservable private information (or firm characteristics) that makes firms to adopt above-
average corporate governance also helps to increase firm value. However, adopting above-average corporate 
governance per se actually reduces firm value. The combined effect of private information and corporate governance 
seems to be consistent with the weak or lack of impact of corporate governance reported in Table 3. When the 
regression is run for the two sub-samples, the impact of private information (the self-selection effect) is very strong 
for the above-average group but not significant for the below-average group.  
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Table 5: Panel Estimation with Self-Selection Adjustment 
The logarithm of Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable in the regressions. The explanatory variables’ descriptions are the same as 
those in Table 2 with the addition of IMR. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level 
respectively. 
Variable Whole sample Above-average sample Below-average sample 
CD -0.819***   
TA -0.198*** 0.055*** -0.148*** 
SA -0.074*** -0.094*** -0.078*** 
RA 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 
LV 0.136*** 0.106*** 0.022 
WH 0.224*** 0.057 0.022 
SP 0.132** 0.157** 0.051 
MO -0.023* 0.016 -0.005 
Y5 0.041 0.042 0.054 
Y6 0.028 0.021 0.049 
Y7 0.139*** 0.088*** 0.113*** 
Y8 -0.081*** -0.121*** -0.143*** 
IMR 0.444*** 0.571*** -0.220 
# of firm-year obs 530 253 277 
R-squared 0.378 0.936 0.884 
 
 
Models that do not separate the two effects (such as those in Table 2 and 3) often detect no or marginally 
significant connection between corporate governance and firm value. Recognizing the importance (or the almost 
impossible task) of controlling all the relevant information, the self-selection model provides a fresh perspective on 
the impact of corporate governance. It suggests that caution should be taken when interpreting results in empirical 
corporate governance studies. 
 
In a country like Canada where the regulation on corporate governance is in a flexible “comply-or-explain” 
framework companies are expected to choose the governance practice that best suits their needs. The findings in 
Table 5 suggest that corporate governance may serves as a signalling tool to the stakeholders. Certain firm 
characteristics, which can increase firm value, may be unobservable to investors. Firms with these favourable 
characteristics (or private information) signal to the market by adopting high-standard corporate governance. 
However, since adopting high-standard corporate governance per se can be very costly (e.g., Bauer et al. (2004) 
finds negative relationship between governance standards and earnings-based performance measures), firms without 
the favourable private information would choose not to adopt sound governance practices. The results in Tables 4 
and 5 provide support to the view that unobserved firm heterogeneity (private information) may predict both 
governance and firm value, leading to a spurious correlation between the two (Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006). 
This suggests that we should be very cautious to claim any causal relationship between corporate governance and 
firm value. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
While improving corporate governance is increasingly popular and seems be such a right thing to do, it is 
puzzling that almost no Canadian studies detect any association between corporate governance and firm value. 
Doesn’t corporate governance matter in Canada? 
 
This study provides a fresh perspective on this puzzle. There are actually two effects combined in the 
seemingly weak or insignificant connection between corporate governance and firm value. On one hand, some 
unobservable private information makes some firms to adopt sound corporate governance and the same information 
(or firm characteristics) increases firm value. On the other hand, adopting sound corporate governance per se 
actually hurts corporations by reducing their firm values.  
 
In future research it may be interesting to investigate to gain some better understanding of these 
unobservable firm characteristics. It is also of interest to look at the impact on firm value of the components (i.e., 
board composition, shareholding and compensation, shareholder rights, and disclosure) of corporate governance 
scores. 
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